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Political Continuity Versus Social
Change: The Sustainability of
Neoliberal Reform in Brazil
Peter R. Kingstone*
How sustainable are the neoliberal reforms that almost all Latin American nations have
embraced? Most Latin American governments turned to neoliberalism in the 1980s in a
context of severe economic crisis. At the time, the set of government and market reforms
lumped under the label neoliberalism appeared to be the only solution to the combination of
inflation and economic stagnation. Many social scientists initially doubted that the reforms
would succeed economically or politically.' Nevertheless, most Latin American nations suc-
ceeded in controlling inflation, encouraging a new inflow of foreign capital, and generating
some growth. Not surprisingly, neoliberal candidates prospered at the ballot box as well.2
Yet, as of 1997, analysts and policy makers have begun to express renewed doubts. In partic-
ular, neoliberalism's failure to address poverty, promote rapid growth, or promote an equi-
table distribution of growth has called into question its future.3
Brazil was one of the last countries in the region to turn to neoliberal reforms. Several
factors helped delay the shift in policy orientation. First, import substitution worked bet-
ter and longer than anywhere else in the region. As a consequence, Brazilians faced less
Ph.D., Univ. of California (Berkeley), 1994; Asst. Professor of Political Science at the Univ. of
Vermont. Professor Kingstone has several works in progress, including chapters in forthcoming
volumes on financial integration and democracy as well as neo-liberal reform and democracy. He
is also the co-editor of Democratic Brazil (forthcoming, Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.).
Paper prepared for Second Conference on "The Economic and Political Challenges of Market
Reforms in Latin America", Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, 4 October 1997.
1. See generally DEMOCRACY, MARKETS, AND STRUCTURAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: ARGENTINA,
BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND MEXICO (William C. Smith et al. eds., 1993); Dani Rodrik, The Limits
of Trade Reform in Developing Countries, J. OF ECON. PERSP., Winter 1992, at 87 [hereinafter
Rodrik, The Limits of Trade Reform]; THE LIMITS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION: No PANACEA: THE
EXPERIENCES OF LATIN AMERICA AND EAST ASIA (Tariq Banuri ed., 1991); Dani Rodrik, Promises,
Promises: Credible Policy Reform Via Signaling, ECON. J., Sept. 1989, at 756 [hereinafter Rodrik,
Promises, Promises].
2. Barbara Geddes, The Politics of Economic Liberalization, 30 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 195 214 (1995).
3. PHILLIP D. OXHORN & PAMELA STARR, THE PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL LIBERALIZ1TION (1998). In fact, Dani Rodrik argued in 1992 that at worst neoliberalism
could drive a country into economic ruin and at best it could produce a positive environment for
development. Rodrik, The Limits of Trade Reform, supra note 1, at 103. In his conclusion Rodrik
called for modesty about the claims one made for trade reform. Id. In hindsight, this seems
quite prophetic.
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pressure to shift to implement neoliberal reforms and the reform process itself lacked a
well defined constituency. Second, Brazil had the most sophisticated system of indexing
inflation in the world. As a result, the organized segments of Brazilian society enjoyed
considerable protection while only the poor and unorganized truly suffered inflation's
effects. In general, Brazilian policy makers seemed inured to the plight of at least fifty per-
cent of the population.4 Finally, Brazil's chaotic political system made it hard to imple-
me nt any policy, let alone a significant shift in economic strategy. Overall, there were good
reasons to doubt that economic reforms, once they started, would in fact endure.
However, quite to the contrary, the reform process is probably more stable in Brazil
than almost any other Latin American nation. First, Brazil's 1994 stabilization plan, the
Real Plan, was well conceived and well implemented.5 Moreover, it is the only stabilization
plan in the region that has directly benefited the poor rather than hurt them.6 Second, the
success of the Real Plan has lured in billions of dollars of foreign investment, both portfo-
lio and direct. Again, unlike most other Latin American nations, Brazil's size makes it
inherently attractive for investors and therefore permits much more policy flexibility and
unorthodoxy. Finally, the reform process has generated a considerable political con-
stituency for reforms, while there is virtually no important opposition.
Despite the basis for optimism, some concern remains. First, the Real Plan has relied
on an exchange rate anchor to maintain price stability.7 Exchange rate anchors are very
susceptible to external payments shocks, particularly in the current economic context of
significant reliance on more volatile portfolio investments. Brazilian policy makers under-
stand the risks of using the exchange rate as an anchor, but they have been unable to pass
vital constitutional reforms that would strengthen the currency. Their inability to do so
reflects the continuity of a patronage dominated, chaotic, and poor functioning political
4. LuIs CARLOS BRESSER PEREIRA, ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STATE REFORM IN BRAZIL: TOWARD A NEW
INTERPRETATION IN LATIN AMERICA ch. 11 (1996).
5. See generally Albert Fishlow, Is This Plan For Real?, in BRAZIL UNDER CARDOSO (Susan K. Purcell &
Roett Riordan eds., 1997) [hereinafter Fishlow, Is This Plan For Real]; Gesner Oliveria & Celso
Toledo, The Brazilian Economy Under the Real Prospects for Stabilization and Growth, (paper
presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Washington D.C., Sept. 28 30, 1995); Jeffrey
Sachs & Alvaro Zini, Brazilian Inflation and the "Plano Real" (paper presented at the Latin
American Studies Association, Washington D.C., Sept. 28-30, 1995); WERNER BAER, THE
BRAZILIAN ECONOMY: GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1983).
6. Leslie Armijo, Inflation and Insouciance: The Peculiar Brazilian Game, 31 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 7-46
(1996).
7. Ceslo Martone, Recent Economic Policy in Brazil Before and After the Mexican Peso Crisis, in THE
MEXICAN PESO CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPEClVES (Riordan Roett ed., 1996).
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system. 8 At this writing in late 1997, the Brazilian situation has created a tension between
a set of social changes that support reforms and a political process that threatens them.
Should Brazil suffer a balance of payments shock with an accompanying return of infla-
tion, it is conceivable that the political protection of patronage and particularistic interests
will undermine the strength of social support. Should that occur, some sort of retrench-
ment against neoliberal reform could emerge. The rest of this paper examines the logic
and evidence for this qualified optimistic assessment.
I. Economic Reform as a Technical and Political Problem.
All economic reform programs present two principal challenges, one technical and one
political.9 From a technical perspective, the challenge facing policy makers is how to design
a sound reform project. Relatedly, policy makers face a technical problem of insuring com-
petent implementation of the reform project On the surface, this challenge seems simple
enough in principle, but often proves more difficult in practice. From a political perspec-
tive, reformers face two distinct challenges: (1) how to build and maintain electoral support
(in democracies at least); and (2) how to maneuver a reform program through the political
system. In other words, policy makers' political problem is how to construct an electoral
coalition on the one hand and how to construct a governing coalition on the other.
Brazil's track record looked quite mixed on these two points prior to 1994. Successive
Finance Ministers had imposed repeated invasive, poorly designed, and/or poorly executed
stabilization plans on Brazilian society between 1986 and 1993.10 These plans put the
economy on a roller coaster with wildly fluctuating rates of growth, investment, and infla-
tion. Brazilians had become extremely wary of new government efforts to stabilize the
economy and particularly adept at extracting whatever advantage they could through
financial speculation.
Despite the chaos of the economic scene, or perhaps because of it, successive govern-
ments were able to construct and reconstruct coalitions in favor of economic reform. 11
Thus, prior to 1994, Brazilian presidents had initiated a privatization program, introduced
8. See generally Timothy I. Power, Why Brazil Slept? The Search for Political Institutions, 1985-1997,
in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (Peter R. Kingstone & Timothy J. Power eds., forthcoming) [hereinafter
Power, Why Brazil Slept]; Timothy J. Power, The Pen is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential
Decree Power in Brazil, (paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Conference,
Atlanta, Ga., Mar. 10-12, 1994) [hereinafter Power, The Pen is Mightier than the Congress];
Timothy J. Power, Politicized Democracy: Competition, Institutions, and 'Civic Fatigue' in Brazi J.
INTERAM. STUD. & WORLD AFF., Fall 1991, at 75-112; SCOTT MAINWARING & MATTHEW S. SHUGART,
-PRESIDENTIALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (1997); Scott Mainwaring, Dilemmas of
Multiparty Presidential Democracy: The Case of Brazil (paper presented at the Helen Kellogg
Institute for International Studies, Mar. 1992) [hereinafter Mainwaring, Dilemmas of Multiparty
Presidential Democracy]; Scott Mainwaring, Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in
Comparative Perspective, COMP. POL., Oct. 1991, at 21-44 [hereinafter Mainwaring, Politicians,
Parties, and Electoral Systems].
9. This way of characterizing the problem of economic change comes from John Zysman.
10. See BAER, supra note 5; Bresser Pereira, supra note 4.
11. Peter R. Kingstone, The Limits of Neoliberalism: Business, the State, and Democratic Consolidation
in Brazi in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (Peter R. Kingstone & Timothy J. Power eds., 1998).
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a commercial liberalization plan, radically dismantled the bureaucratic impediments to
foreign commerce, and eliminated several important market reserves.12 The result was
that by 1994, Brazil had implemented a series of important reforms, yet still suffered from
high inflation and highly erratic growth patterns.
The year 1994 represented a turning point for the country. In 1993, interim President
Itamar Franco appointed as Finance Minister a noted scholar and highly respected senator
- Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Cardoso used his position to introduce the Real Plan - to
date one of Latin America's (and certainly Brazil's) most effective stabilization plans. Since
its inception in March 1994, low wage earners saw at least twelve percent gains in real
income.1 3 Price stability has attracted investors to Brazil with nine billion U.S. dollars in
foreign direct investment in 1996 and a projected 120 billion U.S. dollars by 2002 . Most
importantly, the plan has successfully brought inflation below ten percent per year for the
first time in almost fifty years. In contrast to the very short duration of previous Brazilian
stabilization plans, the Real Plan has endured over three years at this writing with monthly
inflation rates continuing to decline. Ultimately, the sustainabiity of reforms in general
hinges on the future of the Real plan. That turns on how well the Cardoso administration
manages the continuing technical and political challenges of the Real plan's consolidation.
II. The Real Plan and the Technical Challenges to Reform.
Brazilian stabilization plans prior to the Real Plan had failed either through an inade-
quate implementation or an inadequate diagnosis of the problem. Thus, heterodox
shocks, such as the Cruzado Plan of 1986, collapsed due to political manipulation of the
plan and the Sarney government's failure to address more orthodox elements, such as
excess demand and government deficit spending. 14 In turn, more orthodox solutions,
such as the Collor government's policy as of 1991, failed because they did not address the
significant inertial component that twenty-five years of indexation had induced. 15 Prior
plans also failed because Brazilians had become more adept at anticipating the plans and
evading their consequences. These evasions included preemptive price increases, with-
holding supplies at controlled prices, tax evasion, capital flight, and other forms of exit
from the formal economy. While illegal, these were understandable methods for dealing
with the repeated, invasive attempts to contain inflation. In particular, these attempts
tended to void, or badly violate at least, existing contracts.16 The violation of contracts
eroded the basic trust that actors need to make a market function properly. It is no won-
der that these repeated efforts collapsed.
12. In particular, Bresser Pereira makes this important observation that Brazil's difficulties with sta-
bilization tend to conceal how much successive governments have actually accomplished.
13. Martone, supra note 7, at 60.
14. Lourdes Sola, Heterodox Shock in Brazil Tdcnicos, Politicians, and Democracy, J. LATIN AM. STUD.,
Feb. 1991, at 163-95.
15. See BRESSER PEREIRA, supra note 4; Fishlow, supra note 5.
16. Luis CARLOS BRESSER PEREIRA, JosE MARIA MARAVALL, & ADAM PRZEWORSKI, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN
NEw DEMOCRACIES (1993).
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The Real Plan succeeded because it differed in fundamental ways from its predeces-
sors. First, Cardoso, as Finance Minister, introduced the Real Plan in December 1993, pro-
viding ample time for congressional and societal discussion of its contents. Brazilians
knew exactly what was coming when Cardoso initiated the Real Plan. Second, the admin-
istration initiated the plan with a new unit of reference, the Unit of Real Value (URV)
rather than a new currency. Brazilians had created several units of reference to help them
adjust contracts to the rate of inflation. The government introduced the URV as an alter-
native unit that was linked to the exchange rate. The publicly stated intention was to allow
economic actors time to adjust their contracts to the new unit of reference before convert-
ing it into the new currency. The adjustment period permitted economic actors to gradu-
ally and gracefully prepare for the currency change - an important innovation, especially
considering the Real Plan was essentially an implicit dollarization. Third, Cardoso had
secured an ad ho4 one time fiscal adjustment through the Social Emergency Fund (FSE) -
a measure that appropriated resources constitutionally protected as transfers to the states
and municipalities. Finally, Cardoso benefited from Fernando Collor's (1990-1992) legacy
of low import tariffs and a relatively sound budget balance.
The combination of well designed heterodox elements with effective implementation
of orthodox elements made the Real Plan work. The currency shift occurred virtually
without a snag and without requiring new wage and price controls. 17 On the orthodox
side, the FSE left the state with a balanced budget and commercial liberalization hindered
preemptive price increases or other efforts to manipulate prices.
The results appeared immediately. Inflation fell from a high of 50 percent per month
in June 1994 to less than 2 percent per month on the eve of the October 4 presidential elec-
tion. Inflation dropped to 12 percent for 1995, below 10 percent in 1996, and was project-
ed around 7 percent for 1997. GDP growth registered 2.5 percent in 1995 then rose to
roughly 3.5 percent for 1996 and over 4 percent for 1997 (projected).18 Although Brazil's
growth rates remained weak, the Real Plan had still accomplished more than any stabiliza-
tion plan in Brazilian history.
Nevertheless, the Real Plan revealed several technical problems. First, the government
had to clean up the state's fiscal condition to fully consolidate the Real Plan. The Cardoso
administration re-negotiated the FSE (renamed the FEF - Fiscal Emergency Fund) in late
1995 and again in 1997. However, deep problems remained in the social security system
(Previdencia), the civil service system, and the fiscal system. 19 Each of these areas con-
tributed to an erosion of the government's finances from a 1 percent surplus in 1994 to
deficits in the order of 4.5 percent of GDP through 1995-1997.20 Second, in the absence of
these crucial reforms, the government had to rely on far less secure and ultimately more
destructive methods of securing the currency: these methods included maintaining the
17. Although the Franco administration helped Cardoso's electoral campaign by threatening to pros-
ecute any business person who raised wages in the period leading up to the October 1994
Presidential election.
18. Figures from Brazilian Central Bank.
19. Kurt Weyland, How Much Political Power Do Economic Forces Have? Conflicts Over Social




exchange rate anchor; relying on high interest rates to discourage consumption and
imports and to help attract foreign investment; and a rapid escalation of public debt, both
to sterilize capital inflows and to compensate for growing budget shortfalls.
This policy sharply affected a whole array of other elements of the government's
growth policy. For one, credit restrictions sharply hurt domestic producers. Although the
administration gradually lowered rates and eventually made credit available at reduced
rates for some types of consumers and for some producers, private debt, private default,
and corporate bankruptcy rates remained at historic levels.21 Similarly, the policy hurt the
capacity of domestic producers to adjust to import competition. Tight credit combined
with an overvalued currency and low tariff barriers shifted all advantages to either imports
or foreign investors seeking entry to the Brazilian market. The policy almost certainly con-
tributed to rising unemployment, although there is some controversy over both the causes
of unemployment and the actual numbers of unemployed.
The government clearly intended to place its bets on foreign direct investment and the
rise of exports from Brazil. Neither bet has proven a good one. Foreign investors have
entered at a rapid rate, but without the desired consequences. Foreign investors have not
made any impact on employment. In fact, Cardoso himself blames competitive modern-
ization for the country's unemployment rate.22 As for exports, they have risen, but much
slower than imports. Brazil's trade surplus began to erode by 1994-1995. By July 1997, the
country's trade deficit had climbed over 4 percent of GDP. Addressing this cluster of prob-
lems requires passing the same set of constitutional reforms necessary to finally consoli-
date the Real Plan. That is a political problem.
III. The Real Plan and the Political Challenges to Reform.
Managing the political process of economic reform in Brazil particularly highlights the
tension between political continuity and social change. On one side, Cardoso, like Fernando
Color before him, has had to work to construct a governing coalition in Brazil's chaotic poli-
ty. Brazil's political parties are notoriously fragmented and weak 23 Brazilian politicians are
notoriously non-ideological; rather, they focus intensely on access to patronage and service
to very narrow, well defined corporative constituencies.24 Bargaining with this group has
been very complex, unpredictable, and usually ineffective. This problem reflects both long-
standing features of the Brazilian state as well as more recent problems enshrined in the 1988
Constitution. With the exception of the Workers' Party and a few smaller leftist parties, most
Brazilian politicians do not oppose the reform process.25
21. Fiesp Noticias.
22. This is Cardoso's standard defense whenever the issue of unemployment comes up.
23. Mainwaring, Politicians Parties, and Electoral Systems, supra note 8; Scott Mainwaring & Timothy
Scully, Party Systems in Latin America, in BUILDING DEMOcRATIc INSTITUIIONS: PARTY SYSTEMS IN
LATIN AMERICA (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy Scully eds., 1995).
24. Barry Ames, Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures and Pork Barrek Bases of Voting in the Brazilian
Congress, J. POL., May 1995, at 324; Barry Ames, The Reverse Coattails Effect: Local Party
Organization in the 1989 Presidential Election, AM. POL. Sci. REv., Mar. 1994, at 95; Mainwaring,
Dilemmas of Multiparty Presidential Democracy, supra note 8; Mainwaring, Politicians, Parties,
and Electoral Systems, supra note 8.
25. Id.
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In fact, surveys of Members of Congress suggest that they support it in principle.26
However, the Constitutional reforms needed to consolidate the Real Plan have enormous
implications for access to patronage and for the entitlements of many of Brazil's best orga-
nized lobby groups.27
On the other side, Cardoso faces a process of relatively rapid social change that has
provided him with a larger constituency for reform than existed previously. The Real Plan
has had marked consequences for the majority of poor Brazilians long neglected by official
policy. On the opposite end of the political spectrum, business groups have had to invest
in specific adjustment strategies for coping with commercial liberalization. As they have
sunk resources into particular strategies, they have become more dependent on continuing
the reform process. 28 Thus, Cardoso has been able to draw political support from impor-
tant social groups that have emerged as either beneficiaries of or at least stake holders in
the success of economic reform.
IV. Political Continuity and the Obstacles to Economic Reform.
Brazil's political system is one of the least cohesive, coherent, and effective in the west-
ern world. Analysts such as Scott Mainwaring, Timothy Power, and Barry Ames, among
others, have noted a host of problems ranging from perversities of the electoral system to
the fragility of the party system to dilemmas of Brazilian multiparty presidentialism. The
Brazilian political system grew out of a set of compromises that preserved the influence of
regional elites at the expense of strong national organizations. That diffused quality
endured through the post-war period into the New Republic, founded in 1985. In fact, the
writers of the 1988 Constitution, concerned about authoritarian tendencies, further weak-
ened any centralizing tendencies.
A brief summary of institutional design problems in Brazil makes dear the obstacles
to coherent policy-making. Brazil has a proportional representation system for the lower
house of the Congress. Candidates run in state-wide districts with open lists -- meaning
that elections are very expensive and depend on candidates with significant name recogni-
tion or very well defined constituencies. As a consequence, parties exert little control over
their candidates since they have little to offer them. Instead, candidates focus primarily on
obtaining resources for their constituencies - whether geographic or functional (referred
to as corporativist in Brazil). Furthermore, P.R. has allowed a proliferation of small par-
ties that clutter the political system. The result of these features is that bargaining is
extremely complex within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive.
Party leaders face sharp limits in how much they can promise and how effectively they can
deliver party votes.
This is particularly aggravating for executive-legislative bargaining because the
Brazilian President in fact must pass almost all of his or her agenda through Congress.
26. BOLIVAR LAMOUNIER & MARIA TERESA SADEK RIBEIRO DE SOUZA, DEPOIS DA TRANSII AO:
DEMOCRACIA E ELEI0OES No GOVERNO COLLOR (1991).
27. Peter R. Kingstone, Constitutional Reform and Macro-Economic Stability: Implications for
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil, in THE PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION (Philip D. Oxhorn & Pamela Starr eds., 1998).
28. Power, The Pen is Mightier than the Congress, supra note 8.
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This has resulted in two qualities of Brazilian governance. First, Brazilian presidents are
engaged in a constant process of coalition building and bargaining over compensation for
political support. Second, every president in the New Republic has relied extensively on
provisional measures that have the power of law for thirty days before either the Congress
votes on it or the President reissues them. 29 That practice has hurt Congressional-
Presidential relations as well as hopelessly clogging the Congressional agenda with provi-
sional measure votes. 30
The impact of these qualities on economic governance has been mixed. On the one
hand, venal, patronage demanding politicians have been willing to support most policies as
long as executives have been willing to pay the price. In fact, survey work shows that large
majorities of members of Congress support the whole array of reforms that Cardoso has
tried to push.3 1 These reforms have included support for privatizations, the end of market
reserves for domestic producers, commercial liberalization, financial liberalization, deregula-
tion of several areas of the economy (most dramatically in the area of foreign commerce), as
well as civil service, social welfare, and tax reforms. These statements of support have not
been merely rhetorical. The Congress has approved most of the items noted above.
However, they have not yet approved any real reforms to the Constitution in the area
of civil service and only very limited reforms to social welfare and the fiscal system.
Successive presidents since Fernando Collor have tried without success to pass these
reforms. Color's effort, dubbed the emendib (giant amendment), was tabled permanent-
ly. Under Itamar Franco, Congress met to review the Constitution in 1993. Led by
Finance Minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the government sought the same set of
constitutional reforms with virtually no success. Opponents and supporters alike
swamped Congress with over 30,000 amendments and ultimately only passed six, includ-
ing the Social Emergency Fund (FSE). Since Cardoso's inauguration in January 1995, the
government has made repeated efforts to pass these reforms without success. As of late
1997, they still have made little headway.
The reasons for this failure are readily apparent. Despite the majority support for these
reforms in principle, few members of Congress want to record a vote that cuts them off from
important sources of patronage or visibly affects an important, well-organized lobby group.32
Civil service reforms threaten well organized public sector employees (of which there are
many in Brazil) as well as threaten an important source of patronage for legislators. Social
welfare reforms threaten public sector employees and retirees in particular as well as threaten
access to an important source of patronage. Finally, the fiscal system favors the states and
municipalities (and their ability to finance their crucial patronage systems). Consequently, a
powerful array of forces stand against changes in the system. This remains true even though
the state governors support some change to relieve their budget problems and that fiscal
reform is widely understood as the linchpin of successful consolidation of the Real Plan.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. LAMOUNIER & DE SOUZA, supra note 26.
32. KURT WEYLAND, DEMOCRACY WITHOUT EQUITY: FAILURES OF REFORM IN BRAZIL (1996); Kurt
Weyland, How Much Political Power do Economic Forces Have? Conflicts Over Social Insurance
Reform in Contemporary Brazil (unpublished paper presented at the Latin American Studies
Association, Sept. 28, 1995).
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This confusing, chaotic, and ineffectual political system dates back to the beginning of
the New Republic and back even into the formation of the modern Brazilian state.
Political reform is something that every politician, political analyst, and journalist discuss-
es and perceives as crucial. Nevertheless, the obstacles to reforming the political system are
even more daunting than the obstacles to economic reforms. Thus, the political system
has shown remarkable continuity through the 1980s and 1990s and promises to continue
to do so. As long as it does, it will present the most pressing challenge to consolidating
economic reforms.
V. Social Change and the Bases of Political Support for
Economic Reform.
If political continuity represents a vulnerable point for the future of economic
reforms, social changes in the 1990s represent the strongest base of support. The success
of the Real Plan since 1994 provoked rapid and significant social changes that stand in
sharp contrast to the continuity of the political system. Those changes occurred primarily
within the Real Plan's two most important constituencies: the business community and
the poor. In the case of the business community, price stability allowed competitive
adjustments that firms had put off previously. As both domestic and well-established
MNC's invested in particular strategies, they became more dependent on the successful
continuation of government policy. 33 Brazil's poor, roughly 50 percent of the population,
historically paid the highest price for inflation. This large, poorly unorganized group of
voters discovered the benefits of price stability as their real incomes increased
substantially.34 Both groups represent important sources of political support for the
Cardoso government and the reform process. Nevertheless, there remain vulnerabilities in
both sources of support.
A. BUSINESS.
One of the most important constituencies for the reform process lies in the business
community. Domestic business groups had been calling vociferously for market and state
reforms since 1985.35 Although the state protected domestic business (as well as MNC's
producing in Brazil) for sixty years, business leaders recognized the need for change.
Chronic high inflation, eroding state finances, and a shrinking internal market among
other problems convinced business leaders that the status quo was not viable. As a result, a
broad coalition of industrialists, bankers, and merchants were available to support the
reform process.
However, reforms proceeded in fits and starts between 1985 and 1996. Industrialists
.and bankers put off making competitive improvements in a context of sharp uncertainty.
The uncertainty of the reform process also weakened business resolve in supporting the
33. Id.
34. Power, Why Brazil Slept, supra note 8.
35. Peter R. Kingstone, Shaping Business Interests: The Politics of Neoliberalism in Brazil, 1985-1992
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)) (on file with
author).
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changes. By 1994, there existed constituencies within the business community for further
reform as well as for some sort of retrenchment. 36
That situation changed when Cardoso successfully implemented the Real Plan. Price
stability attracted imports and foreign investors, both of which forced domestic producers
to decisively choose their adjustment strategies. Brazil's largest banks swelled as they con-
sumed smaller, weaker banks long protected by inflation profits. The commercial class
prospered as new consumers entered the market. Among industrialists, domestic produc-
ers faced a choice: to compete, to associate in a variety of ways with foreign capital, or to
exit the market. As of 1997, this process was still underway, but the evidence clearly point-
ed to rapid decision-making along these dimensions. 37
Domestic industrialists that have chosen to compete depend heavily on the continua-
tion of the constitutional reform process. This group, made up of large numbers of small
and medium sized enterprises, suffers from highly uncompetitive capital and labor costs,
as well as an extraordinarily inefficient tax system. This group has indicated in a variety of
fora that it is open to both continued market reforms as well as some kind of retrench-
ment of the reform process. However, their continued support for market reforms
depends on Cardoso completing the constitutional reforms that promise to reduce what
Brazilian business people refer to as the "Brazil cost.'
Newspaper and business association reports as well as personal interviews suggest that
many domestic industrialists have sought some sort of association with foreign capital.
These include mergers, sub-contracting arrangements, becoming licensed distributors of
MNC goods, as well as participation in conglomerates with MNC's. This category of pro-
ducers has made a definitive choice in favor of continuing the reform process and, along
with the new big banks and imports/exports traders, is unlikely to support a retrenchment
of the reform process.
While this new clustering of businesses favoring market reforms is important, there
are several crucial limitations to this support. First, their behavior has not supported the
Cardoso administration strategy. Many of these new foreign investors and domestic part-
ners have focused primarily on the internal market. Brazil's mix of payroll taxes, infra-
structure problems, and other assorted costs of production weaken it as an export plat-
form. The Cardoso government moved to improve export conditions, mainly by repealing
several export related taxes. 38 Exports have increased since 1994, but far below the pace of
imports. Some of the existing and a lot of the anticipated foreign investment is targeted at
purchasing privatized assets - some of which exports, such as the Compania Vale do Rio
Doce (CVRD) while others, such as the anticipated telecommunications investments, do
not. Another large segment of foreign investment has been buying existing firms in order
to acquire their distribution networks. Thus, MNC's and their new domestic partners are
limited as contributors to a pro-exports strategy.
36. Elizabeth McQuerry, Private Sector Responses to Economic Liberalization Policies in Brazil A Look
within Sao Paulo's Capitol Goods Sector, in 16 REViSTA DE ECONOMIC POLITcA 31 55 (1996).
37. Peter R. Kingstone, Crafting Coalitions for Reform: Business Preferences, Political Institutions
and the Politics of Neoliberal Reform in Brazil (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
38. An action taken through the Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Commerce & Trade in 1997.
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A second limitation is that the process of modernization has eliminated over two mil-
lion jobs since 1990 and has left the unofficial unemployment rate hovering around 16
percent 39 The continued reform process is unlikely to quickly change the employment
situation. While Cardoso has maintained his political support overall, polls have shown
that voters have given failing marks on his employment policies.40
Finally, given that many foreign investors have focused on the internal market, they
may still support some sort of retrenchment as long as it does not restrict their access to
that market. The clearest indication of that came out of the negotiations with American
auto makers on the location of their production within Mercosur. As American auto pro-
ducers, such as Ford, threatened to relocate production to Argentina, the Cardoso adminis-
tration unveiled their "auto industrial policy" - a thinly veiled protectionist policy. Despite
the furor the policy produced in Japan, Korea, the United States, as well as Mercoser part-
ners (notably Argentina), the plan worked. In fact, since the decision, auto producers have
pledged upwards of 16 billion U.S. dollars in investments by 2002. Similar deals are imag-
inable among producers of most consumer durables.
B. POOR VOTERS.
The other crucial constituency for market reforms has been poor voters. Brazil's poor
roughly comprise 50 percent of the population. As such a large bloc, they constitute a crit-
ical voting group. In August 1994, low income voters shifted their preferences from Lula to
Cardoso as they became aware of the effects the paternity of the Real Plan. Since 1994,
they have remained an important source of political support for Cardoso, largely because
of price stability.
This sharply differentiates the Brazilian case from other Latin American cases of
neoliberal reform. Typically, the poorest members of society bear the brunt of stabiliza-
tion. However, Brazil's sophisticated indexation system altered that pattern. Introduced
by the military government in 1967, the indexation system allowed all actors in the formal
economy to adjust wages, prices, tax payments, and all other contracts to the rate of infla-
tion. This made inflation very hard to eradicate (inertial inflation), but it also provided a
degree of protection from inflation's worst effects. Unfortunately, workers in the informal
economy had no protection at all. Thus, inflation acted as a brutal tax on the poor infor-
mal sector workers while sparing virtually everybody else.
The advent of price stability produced immediate positive benefits for informal sector
workers. Real income grew 12 percent in the first two years of the Plan. Prices of basic
goods remained stable with wages growing at a faster rate than prices across much of the
economy. As a result, poor consumers were able to purchase goods they had never bought
before. Poultry, meat, televisions, radios, washing machines, cement for building, and fast
foods among others all reached record levels of sales. Nationally, five million people in
urban centers were lifted out of poverty in the first two years of the plan. This represented
a decrease in the proportion of poor in these urban centers from over 40 percent of the
39. Statistics from Brazil's Departamento Intersindical de Estatistica e Estudos S6cio-Econ6micos
(DIEESE).
40. Veja, June 1996.
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population to just under 30 percent. 41 Thus, it is not surprising that Cardoso has main-
tained a strong constituency among low income voters. Should inflation remain low,
Cardoso will very likely gain these votes in 1998 as he did in 1994. In fact, in interviews
conducted in June 1996, business elites explicitly identified this group of voters as the prin-
cipal reason for confidence in the sustainability of the reform process. Business people
repeatedly observed that these voters would penalize politicians for behavior hurtful to the
reform process.
However, this confidence is almost certainly overstated. First, this level of support is
intimately linked to the fate of the Real Plan. Should inflation return, poor voters' support
is likely to evaporate quickly.42 This is especially true because voters have given the
Cardoso government low marks on virtually every other area of concern to them. In par-
ticular, as of 1996 voters had given the government failing grades on each of the five social
policy issues Cardoso campaigned on in 1994. Furthermore, while Cardoso has retained
his personal credibility, corruption issues have tainted the government. Thus, the Cardoso
government remains quite open to attack on several critical grounds. Second, these poor
voters lack any real mechanism of influence over Members of Congress. Their voting
power lies in executive elections where their votes can decide outcomes. However,
Members of Congress must remain particularly alert to the concerns of well organized
lobby groups that may have interests that threaten the stability of the Real Plan. Against
them, poor voters have no influence. In fact, polls suggest that this group of voters has no
understanding of the links between the stability of the Real Plan and Cardoso's
Constitutional reforms -- which many lobby groups resist on particularistic rather than
ideological grounds. The final important consideration is the character of this voting
group. Low income, informal sector workers are notoriously unorganized and unconnect-
ed to formal political life. They have neither partisan, organizational, or ideological links
to any political party (although the Workers' Party (PT) has tried to organize them). As a
consequence, they represent a dangerous political base that can shift very rapidly. If infla-
tion returns, this mass of unorganized voters will be up for grabs.
VI. Reasons for Optimism.
The analysis above highlighted the tension between political continuity that threatens
the sustainability of economic reform and social change that strengthens the process. The
analysis also identified ways in which social support may erode if political paralysis under-
mines the Real Plan. However, three additional factors influence the political process and
point towards an optimistic conclusion. First, foreign investors are intensely interested in
Brazil, primarily due to the size of its market. As a result, investors have tended to forgive
.Brazil a degree of policy incoherence that other countries could not afford. Second, Brazilian
41. Sonia Rocha, Proportion of Poor in Urban Areas, ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, June 12, 1996, at A7.
42. In fact, a review of opinion polls over the period 1994 to 1997 shows how volatile public opinion
can be. Cardoso and his government have ridden a roller coaster between high levels of approval
and confidence in the fate of the Real and disapproval and low confidence. The changes have
come in response to political events, such as the claim that Sergio Motta, Cardoso's Minister of
Communication, participated in a scheme to buy votes in the Congress. Public anger over the
charge drove support levels down.
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elites seem to be willing to tolerate a confused policy-making process and limited policy suc-
cess as long as they can believe that some future event will solve their problems. This faith in
the future has sustained Brazilian elites through all four presidents of the New Republic.
Finally, Cardoso and his commitment to the reform process remain safe as long as there is no
real alternative. That has been and as of 1997 remains true of Brazil's political situation.
A. EVERYBODY LOVES BRAZIL.
Brazil is one of the few countries in the developing world that everybody wants to suc-
ceed. Foreign investors with mobile capital are relatively indifferent to the success or fail-
ure of most developing nations. However, Brazil's growth potential is tremendous due to
the potential size of its market. Foreign capital flowed out of Brazil during the chaotic lat-
ter half of the 1980s. Little new capital entered during the chaotic early 1990s. Interviews
with MNC's already in Brazil suggested a widespread "wait and see" attitude. With the
onset of the Real Plan, the situation rapidly changed. Less than 18 billion U.S. dollars in
new foreign investment entered Brazil in 1992.43 Just under 80 billion U.S. dollars entered
in 1996. 4 Inflows included very sharp increases in currency loans, portfolio investment,
and direct investment. This occurred despite repeated failures to pass constitutional
reforms Cardoso himself identified as central to consolidating the Real Plan.45 This
occurred despite hints of scandal that the government managed to leave unexamined, but
which remain as possible sources of trouble. This occurred despite a rapid increase in
public debt and the commercial deficit. In return, the Brazilian stock market has rewarded
investors with some of the best returns in the world.
43. FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS, BRAZILIAN CENTRAL BANK (1997).
44. Id.
45. Peter R. Kingstone, Short Money and Long Cycles of Instability: Brazil and the Problem of
Dependence on Foreign Finance in the 1990's, in FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN
EMERGING MARKETS (Leslie E. Armijo & Thomas Bierstecker eds., forthcoming, Pittsburgh Univ.
Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.).
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Foreign Capital Inflows, 1992-1996.
U.S.$ Millions
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Inflows 17791 32667 43073 53885 78999
Portfolio 3863 14971 21600 22559 24684
Direct 1 325 877 2 241 3 285 9 580
Currency Loans* 7979 11031 8756 15883 28078
Financing 2 332 3 286 4 353 4 576 6 828
Prepaid Exports 1 119 1421 1908 4273 7073
Other 1173 1085 4215 3309 2756
Source: Brazilian Central Bank, April 1997.46
*Currency loans include foreign bank loans to private industry, rural financing, mort-
gage financing, debt renewals, export financing, and bonds and fixed/floating interest
rate notes placed by the public sector and the private sector. While the data is not bro-
ken down further here, as of 1996, the large majority of this category was private sec-
tor loans and private sector placement of fixed interest rate notes (of which roughly
45 percent was placed by banks, 45 percent was placed by non-financial companies,
and 10 percent by the public sector.) 47
It is beyond the scope of this paper to account for shifts in capital flows. One thing does
remain clear. As long as new inflows keep coming into Brazil, the government will retain the
capacity to secure the Real Plan and finance its trade deficit. Sylvia Maxfield has reported
that research on capital flows shows that OECD interest rates account for over 80 percent of
capital flows to the developing world.48 If that is true, a rise in rates may reverse the flow of
portfolio investment to Brazil. However, the government has slowly been reducing the risk
of such a shock As of 1996, foreign reserves stood at roughly 60 billion U.S. dollars. The
government had also contained its fiscal deficit through a combination of minimal social
security changes, new tax revenues, renewed growth (and thus improved tax revenues), and
lowered real interest rates. Thus, the country's vulnerability to an external shock has reduced
somewhat 49 Meanwhile, the data for 1997 show even greater capital inflows.
46. See FOREIGN CAPITAL INFLOWS, supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. Sylvia Maxfield, Understanding the Political Implications of Financial Internationalization in
Emerging Market Countries (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of the
American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., Aug. 28, 1997, on file with author and
APSA).
49. See generally Fishlow, Is This Plan For Real supra note 5.
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B. As LONG AS THERE IS HOPE.
A second reason for optimism has to do with how Brazilian elites have responded to
political signals in the past. Elites look for signals that a program or government will fail
or succeed. That does not always depend on specific failures or successes in the policy-
making realm. Brazilian business elites in particular have repeatedly looked to future
events to solve their problems. As long as hope can be deferred to the next event, elites can
discount the weight of current policy struggles. Thus, support can endure even though
governments accomplish little.
During the latter part of Sarney's term in office, Brazilian business elites looked par-
ticularly to the 1989 election. Many Brazilian business people expressed confidence that
the first directly elected President of the New Republic would solve the problems that
Sarney could not. Similarly, during the Collor and Franco governments, business elites
pointed to the 1993 referendum on the political system as well as the scheduled 1993
Constitutional Review. 50 After the failures of both the referendum and the
Constitutional Review, business elites pointed to the 1994 elections. After the disap-
pointment of Cardoso's first three years, business elites began pointing to the probability
of Cardoso's 1998 re-election and the possibility of a new'Constitutional Review in 1999.
This pattern, strongly reinforced during interviews with business people in 1991-1992
and 1996, suggests that the signals of failure have to be very strong before they under-
mine the hope in future events.
Cardoso has been particularly skillful at manipulating the political agenda to feed that
hope. Each time Cardoso has confronted growing obstacles to his policy program and the
resulting public criticism and pressure, he has deftly changed his tactics. This occurred
most notably in mid to late 1996. With repeated failures to pass social security and civil
service reforms, Cardoso faced a rapidly growing chorus of public and business criticism.
To forestall the criticism, Cardoso announced a retreat from constitutional reforms.
Instead, he turned to a series of incremental reforms and renewed his call for a constitu-
tional amendment allowing presidential re-elections. By late 1996, the business communi-
ty leadership dropped its critical tone and raced to endorse Cardosos re-election as the
only possible solution to the stalled reform process.
C. IT'S THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN.
The final factor that strengthens the reform process against the patronage logic that
threatens the Real Plan is that there are no coalition alternatives to Cardoso. Analysts have
noted the general intellectual bankruptcy of the Left in Latin America since the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The Brazilian Left presents a contradictory picture. On the one hand,
the Workers' Party is one of the most vigorous and competitive left-wing parties in Latin
.America. On the other hand, they are riven by internal conflicts that have hurt most of
their efforts at governing at the municipal level.5 1 They have also failed to articulate a dear
alternative to Cardoso's economic program. During the municipal elections of 1996, the
50. Congresso Revisor.
51. William R. Nylen, Contributions of the Workers' Party (PT) to the Consolidation of Democracy in
Brazil, in DEMOCRATIC BRAZIL (Peter R. Kingstone & Timothy J. Power eds., forthcoming,
PittsburghUniv. Press, Pittsburgh, Pa.).
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PT leadership began articulating a program that called for slowing the pace of economic
liberalization. However, their antipathy to Constitutional reform makes a business-labor
alliance unlikely. In any event, their own internal splits and the rising influence of the
"Shiites" make it unlikely that they can stand by that program.
A second alternative coalition began to emerge in 1996 in the context of growing frus-
tration over Cardoso's legislative failures. Paulo Maluf, the former Mayor of Sao Paulo,
began to assert himself as a rival political force. Assisting him was Delfim Netto, a Senator
and the architect of the Brazilian Miracle. With Netto talking in business associations about
the Brazil Cost and the government's errors and Maluf marshaling his forces within the PPB
(the fourth largest party after Cardoso's PSDB), the possibility of a rival seemed real. Maluf's
platform mirrored the PT's call for a slowdown in the pace of economic liberalization.
However, Maluf's platform was sympathetic to the concerns of business and to the need for
Constitutional reform. Maluf's influence seemed to have hit its peak during the 1996 munic-
ipal elections when his hand-picked successor, Celso Pitta, handily beat all other candidates
for the position. This was particularly striking given that Pitta was an unknown, not particu-
larly charismatic, and of African heritage in a primarily white city. Cardoso's hand-picked
opponent, Jos6 Serra was well known, a Minister in Cardoso's cabinet until the campaign,
and aggressively supported by Cardoso and the PSDB Governor, Mario Covas.
As significant a rival as Maluf appeared, his threat ended with the revelation of a pub-
lic finance scandal that tainted both Pitta and Maluf. By early 1997, Maluf was essentially
out of the picture negotiating to keep himself out of the inquiry rather than threatening
Cardoso. Thus, as the 1998 elections approach, the PT has weakened, Maluf is out and the
remaining threats are small. Jaime Lerner, the popular former Mayor of Curitiba left his
party and tried to join Cardoso's PSDB. Itamar Franco, the former President - a man who
as Fernando Collor's Vice-President inspired Dan Quayle comparisons - remains as the
most aggressive challenger. If elites see Cardoso as the only real game in town, it is because
as of 1997, he is.
VII. Conclusion.
Overall, the economic reform process seems fairly strong in Brazil. Strong constituen-
cies exist for privatization, despite the slow pace the government has pursued. Strong con-
stituencies have supported deregulation of the market place. The constituency for com-
mercial liberalization has grown stronger since 1994. Finally, a large majority of Brazilian
policy-makers and elites understand the need for reforms that address the "fiscal crisis of
the state' Indeed, the vast majority of Brazilians have benefited from price stability and
support the continuing defense of the Real Plan -- even if many do not see the connection
between the Real Plan and Constitutional reform. In short, the social support for continu-
ing the reform process is robust.
There are some clear vulnerabilities in the Brazilian situation. The government record
on social issues, such as education, health, land distribution, employment, and security,
remains weak. Corruption, a widespread problem encouraged by perversities of the politi-
cal system, has repeatedly destroyed political careers in recent years. It still lingers as a pos-
sible threat. On the economic side, the export promotion policy has not offset the inflow
of imports and in fact has consistently lost ground over the last two years. While the trade
deficit has been manageable due to enormous capital inflows, there are limits to how much
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of an imbalance the country can finance. In addition, the government's continued reliance
on the exchange rate anchor has forced them to keep growth rates low (in the area of 3-3.5
percent). The combination of an overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates has
yielded record numbers of bankruptcies, hindered further exports, and limited the possi-
bility of creating new jobs.
The good news is that the government understands that. The Cardoso administra-
tion, on the whole has acted quite competently. Their problem is that the solution to the
economic problems lies in passing difficult reforms through a Congress committed to pro-
tecting the narrow interests served by the existing Constitution. The Cardoso government
has made numerous attempts using a variety of tactics, from patronage to appeals to the
media to hurling insults at Congress. To date, almost nothing has been done. As long as
capital continues to flow in, the country can get away with it. Clearly, that is not the pre-
ferred solution for anybody.
Should an external payments shock occur, inflation could return. Without indexa-
tion, even relatively small increases in inflation might rapidly erode the support of the big
mass of poor voters. If that occurs, potential rivals could find chinks in Cardoso's armor
quite easily. What would an alternative coalition look like? It is doubtful that it would
involve a reversal of the economic program that has progressed in fits and starts for the
past eight years. Rather, it is more likely that it would involve some sort of retrenchment -
a digging in of heels so to speak. That might include some limited use of protection to
ease the speed of commercial liberalization. It may very well include more attention to a
range of social issues. However, as Bresser Pereira has observed, at the heart of Brazil's
problems lies the fiscal crisis of the state. Solving it requires state reforms and some degree
of reliance on new capital inflows from foreign investors. Any political program will have
to face that. Thus, even if a retrenchment of some sort occurs, the new economic program
will likely continue to point in the same direction.
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